Cross-country differences in the financing of business start-ups: do personal bankruptcy laws matter? co-authored with Jürgen Hanssens (Ghent University) and Tom Vanacker (Ghent University)
Abstract: We examine cross-country differences in the financing of start-ups in their initial year of operation. To do so, we employ a dataset of 2,849,997 start-ups from 26 European countries founded between 2005 and 2012. We find that time-invariant, country-specific factors are important determinants of start-ups’ capital structure. We further document how personal bankruptcy laws influence start-ups’ capital structure. Specifically, start-ups use less debt if a “fresh start”—the possibility for bankrupt entrepreneurs to discharge their outstanding credit obligations—is available relative to when a “fresh start” is not available in a country’s personal bankruptcy laws. When we use a difference-in-differences approach to exploit country-level changes in the availability of a “fresh start”, we similarly find that start-ups use less debt after the installment of a “fresh start”. In sum, we provide new cross-country evidence on the financing of start-ups in general and the role of personal bankruptcy laws on start-up financing more in specific
Local banking development and the use of debt financing by start-up firms, co-authored with Maurizio La Rocca (University of Calabria) and Tom Vanacker (Ghent University)
Abstract: We investigate the effect of local banking development on the use of debt financing by start-up firms for a large sample of Italian start-ups. We find that start-ups use more debt financing when they are located in a province which has more bank branches relative to population and in which the bank market is less concentrated. Our results suggest that the effect of bank branch density is not different for national banks or local cooperative banks. However, the presence of foreign banks in a province reduces the use of debt by start-ups. This finding is consistent with the “cream-skimming” hypothesis, according to which foreign banks focus on large transparent customers, thereby reducing the availability of debt for informationally opaque local borrowers such as start-ups.
Stubborn and persistent: the evolution of slack resources in new firms, co-authored with Jürgen Hanssens (Ghent University) and Tom Vanacker (Ghent University)
Abstract: Past research has focused on the effects of possessing slack, assuming levels of slack are dynamic, but without paying explicit attention to the actual build up and deployment—or the evolution—of slack in firms. Drawing on behavioral theory of the firm and the imprinting literature, we propose that slack levels contain an important stable component, whereby founder- CEOs act as a source of imprinting. Thus, initial slack levels strongly influence future slack levels but this relationship weakens when founder-CEOs are replaced. This is particularly the case when founder-CEO replacements occur early on because there has been limited time for institutionalizing processes to occur. We test these propositions using data on 1,625 firms founded in Belgium in 1998 that are tracked for up to 15 years. Findings are consistent with our predictions. Taken together, our study provides a novel theoretical perspective and first-time empirical evidence on the evolution of slack levels in firms.
The Recent Financial Crisis, Start-up Financing, and Survival, co-authored with Tom Vanacker (Ghent University)
Abstract: We investigate the effects of the recent financial crisis―a negative shock to the supply of credit—on start-up financing and survival using a data set that covers all Belgian business registrations between 2006 and 2009. We find that bank debt is the single most important source of funding, even for start-ups founded during the crisis. However, start-ups founded in crisis years use less bank debt and have a higher likelihood to go bankrupt. Consistent with a credit supply shock driving our findings, these effects are stronger for start-ups in bank dependent industries and start-ups founded by financially constrained entrepreneurs.
Investor protection, taxation and dividend policy: Evidence from Belgium, 1838-2012, co-authored with Leentje Moortgat and Jan Annaert (University of Antwerp)
Abstract: We investigate how changes in investor protection and taxation legislation affected dividend policy between 1838 and 2012, using a unique sample of all Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE). Investor protection was very weak before World War I, but gradually improved over time. Dividend taxation was introduced in 1920. While it is generally believed that investor protection and taxation are important determinants of dividend policy, we find that dividend policy is remarkably stable over time, even after controlling for firm characteristics. The changing institutional environment had almost no impact on dividend policy of listed Belgian firms.
Performance-Related Remuneration of Directors Before and During the Great Depression in Belgium, co-authored with Veronique Vermoesen (University of Antwerp) and Armin Schwienbacher (Université Côte d’Azur—SKEMA Business School)
Abstract: We study the payment of bonuses (tantièmes) to directors of Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange in the period 1925-1934. Directors received substantial cash bonuses which were positively related to firm performance, measured by accounting income and changes in the market value of equity. If shareholders were expropriated via the payment of excessive director bonuses, we would expect a larger drop in stock market performance during the Great Depression for firms paying higher bonuses. However, this is not confirmed by our findings, which suggest that bonuses were a valuable tool for aligning the interest of directors and shareholders in an environment characterized by weak legal protection of investors.
Multinational corporations/business groups
Earnings Management in Multinational Corporations, co-authored with Christof Beuselinck (IESEG School of Management & LEM), Stefano Cascino (London School of Economics) and Ann Vanstraelen (Maastricht University) – FULL PAPER HERE
Abstract: Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs) from different countries around the world, we examine the determinants of earnings management within the firm. We argue that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings via an “orchestrated” reporting strategy across their subsidiaries. We find that country-level as well as firm-specific characteristics of both parents and subsidiaries jointly explain the location of earnings management inside the firm. Most importantly, we provide compelling evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from differences in the institutional environments of their subsidiaries. Parent companies in high-quality institutional environments tend to manage their consolidated earnings more through subsidiaries in low-quality institutional environments. When regulatory shocks exogenously improve the institutional environment of parent companies, MNCs shift earnings management towards subsidiaries in low-quality institutional environments. Overall, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and have implications for regulatory design
The flight home effect in multinational internal capital markets during the Great Recession, co-authored with Fabiola Montalto
Abstract: We investigate whether the Great Recession induced a ‘flight home effect’ in internal capital markets of multinational firms, whereby multinationals reallocate funding from foreign subsidiaries to their home country after a negative financial shock. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find a significant reduction in group borrowing by Italian subsidiaries of European multinationals since 2008, compared to a propensity score matched sample of subsidiaries of Italian business groups. While the relative reduction in group borrowings by foreign subsidiaries in Italy is partially counterbalanced by an increase in bank borrowings, foreign subsidiaries reduced their investments more than subsidiaries of Italian firms. These effects are more pronounced for subsidiaries of multinationals headquartered in a European country which has been hit harder by the Great Recession.
Other corporate finance/governance papers
Industry Policy uncertainty, Local Government Intervention and Corporate Investment in China, co-authored with Jie Yang and Chaoyang Xu (Wuhan Textile University)
Abstract: We investigate the effect of industrial policy uncertainty caused by changes in China’s Five Year Plan (FYP) on investments by Chinese firms. We find systematic decreases in investments in the year prior to a new FYP for a large sample of listed firms in the 1998-2012 period. The drop in investments is stronger for firms with higher investment irreversibility and in industries sensitive to policy changes. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that industrial policy uncertainty generated by the periodical amendments of the FYP dampens investment. We also find that local government intervention reduces the negative effect of industry policy uncertainty on investments. In provinces with a strong local government, state owned enterprises do not reduce investments in the FYP change period, while private firms do decrease their investments.
Some older papers, which for various reasons were never published but which I think are interesting anyway:
The Value of Stable Ownership during the Global Financial Crisis (latest version: 2013), co-authored with Christof Beuselinck (IESEG School of Management & LEM) and Andy Lardon (University of Antwerp) – FULL PAPER HERE
Abstract: We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms from 2005 to 2010, using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and using pre-and post-crisis periods as benchmarks. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns during the crisis. The positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. Ownership stability was also associated with lower idiosyncratic risk and higher investments. Interestingly, the positive effect of ownership stability during the crisis does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. During a crisis, family firms may use their resources primarily to protect the interest of the family.
Business Elites, Political Connections, and Economic Entrenchment: Evidence from Belgium 1858-1909 (latest version: 2009), co-authored with Livia Ghita (University of Antwerp) and Ludo Cuyvers (University of Antwerp) – FULL PAPER HERE
Abstract: We investigate the evolution and performance of networks based on interlocking directorships between large listed Belgian firms in the 20th century, focusing on the role of financial institutions. Network density was very high for most of the century. Financial institutions played a pivotal role. Network density strongly increased before World War I, but it decreased from the 1930s onwards when universal banks were forced to split up. Political connections followed a similar pattern. For most of the 20th century, firms grew more strongly if they were connected to financial institutions. Combined, our results are consistent with economic entrenchment theory.
Who’s Afraid of Foreigners? Religion, Trust, and Directors in Multinational Corporations (latest version: 2006), co-authored with Catherine Campo (University of Antwerp) – FULL PAPER HERE
Abstract: We investigate how religion and trust in the parent country of multinational corporations affect the likelihood that the board of directors of foreign subsidiaries include parent country nationals, and the likelihood that the managing director of these subsidiaries is a parent country national. For a sample of 781 Belgian subsidiaries of multinational corporations from 13 different countries, we find that the likelihood of parent country (managing) directors is greater if the parent company is located in a Catholic country, or in a country where interpersonal trust is lower. Whether or not parent country nationals generally like foreigners or Belgians does not seem to matter.